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Abstract
We formulate a game-theoretical model of closed rule legislation in the
presence of informational asymmetries. In the model an agenda setter with
private information proposes a policy to a legislature. The legislature appoints
an oversight committee to monitor the agenda setter. We study the rationale
for this appointment, and analyze the equilibrium oversight committee member
choices for the legislators. We conclude that it is optimal for the legislators to
appoint oversight committee members who are as far from them as is the
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only marginally prefer to the status quo.
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1 Introduction
Delegation is an important characteristic of policy making. Providing incentives to
specialize in specic policy matters represents one of the main rationales for dele-
gation (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987 and 1989). Legislators cannot develop expertise
in all policy areas. For that reason they set up committees to study specic pol-
icy domains. They often use closed rule procedures to provide these bodies with
incentives to specialize. However, the delegation of authority can give rise to moral
hazard problems. Therefore this relationship is often portrayed as a principal-agent
relationship.
To regain control over their agents, the principals have several tools at their dis-
posal. Peress (2009) showed that among those tools is the requirement to employ
supermajority rule. If an agenda setter is powerful, the median legislator may pre-
fer to consider the agenda setters proposal under supermajority rather than simple
majority rule. In doing so, the median legislator appoints additional veto players
that are more extreme than himself. He thus creates a credible commitment to reject
proposals that he is indi¤erent over relative to the status quo and obtains a policy
he prefers more. In this paper we argue that under asymmetric information legisla-
tors can achieve similar results by appointing an oversight committee. By using an
oversight committee, a committee without veto rights, that acts as an information
transmitter, legislators can credibly commit to reject marginally improving propos-
als.
One example of legislative delegation with an oversight committee is trade policy
making in the European Union (EU).1 Authors such as Damro (2007) and Kerremans
(2003) argue that delegation in EU external trade policy takes place at two levels.
First, there is delegation of authority from the member state governments to the
legislative members in the Council.2 Second, there is delegation from the Council
members to the Commission: the Commission negotiates trade agreements and drafts
trade policy proposals (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006).3 The Council then considers the
Commissions proposals under supermajority rule, which is called qualied majority
rule in the EU.
1For an analysis of delegation in the EU in general, see Franchino (2005). For formal analyses
of EU policy making see, for example, Crombez (1996) and (1997).
2The Council is one of the EUs two main legislative bodies. It is an intergovernmental body
that consists of one representative per member state.
3The Commission is the EUs executive body, and it has monopoly proposal rights in the
legislative process.
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Even though the Commissions dominant role in trade policy making renders
trade one of the most supranational policy areas in the EU, Aggarwal and Fogarty
(2004), De Bièvre and Dür (2005) and Meunier (2005) also stress the important role
of the member states by pointing out the many tools at their disposal to control
the Commission. The monitoring tool that relates to this paper is the Trade Policy
Committee (TPC).4 The TPC frequently sits at the table with the Commission.
It fullls two basic functions. First, it provides a channel of information to the
Commission on the preferences of the member states. This information may give
the Commission an opportunity to alter its proposals and get them adopted in the
Council. Second, the TPC directly monitors the Commission for the Council and
transmits information to it.
While the rst function is rather clear and has been elaborately discussed in the
literature, less is known about the mechanism of monitoring. Most authors limit
themselves to stating that the principal monitors the agent via the TPC. The reality
is somewhat more complex, that is, the member states in the Council delegate the
authority to monitor the Commission to the TPC.
In this paper we focus on the delegation of monitoring. Since legislators appoint
the members of the oversight committee, they can manipulate this committees pref-
erences and by consequence the credibility of the information the committee trans-
mits. If the Council appoints a TPC with the same preferences as itself, noiseless
information transmission between the TPC and the Council can be expected. Yet
the noisy information stream observed by Damro (2007) suggests that more may be
at play: a Commission o¢ cial, who was interviewed by him, stated that the TPCs
weekly meetings with the Commission serve as an important instrument through
which member states do their best to nd out what is happening in trade negotia-
tions. This suggests that there is indeed an information stream from the Commission
to the Council via the TPC, but that this information is noisy. The noise could be
the result of the TPCs incomplete information or of its strategic use of information.
In this paper we study the latter source of noise.5
4Before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty this committee was know as the Article 133 Commit-
tee. Article 133 has now become Article 207. It states that the Commission has to report regularly
to, and consult with, a special committee established by the Council.
5On trade issues the median legislator in the Council thus arguably uses two mechanisms to
commit to reject marginally improving deals: supermajority rule and an oversight committee. In
this paper we focus on the pivotal legislators and their incentives to appoint oversight committee
members. I think we need to add such a sentence, because it is an obvious comment to make, and
readers may be confused otherwise (they may still be) by the use of supermajority rule in the model
and Peress points we refer to.
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We present a general model of delegation in which an agenda setter is monitored
by an oversight committee, both the agenda setter and the oversight committee have
perfect information, and the legislature considers the agenda setters proposals under
closed rule. We can apply this framework to EU external trade policy-making and
the role of the TPC. While we acknowledge the other functions of the TPC, such as
signaling the preferences of the Council to the Commission, we focus on the oversight
role the TPC fullls and on the Councils strategic considerations in the delegation
of monitoring.
We build our model on the closed rule model put forward by Gilligan and Krehbiel
(1989). Their model deals with heterogeneous committees, but can also be thought of
as a model of a legislature that interacts with an agenda setter on the one hand, and
a committee or lobbyist with a signaling role on the other hand. We extend this view
by allowing the location of the signaling committee to be determined by the legislative
body. The committee can then be thought of as an oversight committee that has
received the authority to monitor the agenda setter. In addition we incorporate
important features of EU trade policy making into our model, such as voting by
supermajority rule in the legislative body. In the EU the Council, the Commission
and the TPC play the roles of legislature, agenda setter and oversight committee,
respectively.6
We nd that the legislators choose to appoint oversight committee members that
have preferences di¤erent from their own. In particular they appoint members who
are as far away from them as is the agenda setter, but in the opposite direction. Leg-
islators thus prefer not to have perfect information on the consequences of policies,
but rather let a strategic information transmitter signal these consequences to them.
Thus they create a credible commitment to refuse proposals that are preferred to the
status quo by the agenda setter, but represent only a marginal improvement for them.
As a result the agenda setter proposes policies the pivotal legislators prefer to the pro-
posals she would make in the absence of oversight or if the legislators were perfectly
6When applied to the EU the model focuses on decision making within the EU. It can be
extended, however, by including a non-EU country and assuming it plays a role in the formulation
of a trade agreement. In equilibrium this country would take into account the preferences of the
TPC and Council members, as does the Commission. In turn the member states would take
into account the countrys preferences when appointing the TPC, as they take the Commissions
preferences into account. The conclusions of our model would thus not be fundamentally di¤erent
if a non-EU country were included in the model. Moreover, we ignore the Parliaments role in
the process. Including the Parliament in the model would merely add another veto player. The
Commission would take its preferences into account, as it takes the preferences of the pivotal TPC
and Council members into account.
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informed. Obtaining a closer policy compensates for informational ine¢ ciencies the
legislators su¤er compared to having perfect information. The distributional losses
the legislators incur as a result of the use of a closed rule, as observed by Gilligan
and Krehbiel (1989), can be reduced when the legislators can strategically choose the
oversight committee members. The legislators can give the agenda setter incentives
to specialize by using a closed rule, while reducing the distributional losses by ap-
pointing oversight committee members who are farther away from the agenda setter
than they are themselves.
In section two we introduce and discuss a perfect information model of a closed
rule procedure with oversight committee. Section three presents the asymmetric
information model that is the main focus of our paper, and analyzes the policy
making process. Section four focuses on the appointment of the oversight committee.
We present conclusions in section ve.
2 A perfect information model
First we consider just two institutions: a legislature and an agenda setter. The policy
space R is assumed to be one dimensional. This dimension could reect degrees of
trade liberalization, for example, with actors on the right being more in favor than
actors on the left. Actors have Euclidean preferences. That is, they prefer policy
results that are closer to rather than farther away from their ideal result. In particular
actor x with ideal policy px derives utility Ux(p) =  (p   px)2 from policy p. The
legislature uses supermajority rule. As a result we can simplify the analysis by
focusing on the two legislators L and R who are pivotal under supermajority rule.
Legislator L is to the left of legislator R, and is pivotal for a move to the right.
Legislator R is pivotal for a move to the left. The agenda setter A is a unitary actor.
For simplicity and without loss of generality we normalize the one-dimensional
policy space such that the average ideal policy result of the two legislators is equal
to zero: L+R
2
= 0, as illustrated in Figure 1. The ideal policy result of legislator R is
set equal to the value R. The ideal policy result of legislator L is then equal to  R.
The ideal policy result of the agenda setter A is assumed to be equal to aR with
a 2 R. Variable a is then a measure of how extreme the agenda setter is relative to
the legislature. We refer to an agenda setter with a in the interval [ 1; 1] as moderate
because her preferences are located between the ideal policies of legislators L and R.
When her level of extremeness lies outside this range, she is considered extreme.
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Figure 1: Perfect information and no oversight committee.
The sequence of events under perfect information is as follows. In the rst stage
the agenda setter drafts a proposal. In the second and nal stage the legislators vote
on the proposal. If both pivotal legislators vote in favor, the proposal is adopted and
becomes policy. Otherwise the status quo prevails. The relevant equilibrium concept
is subgame perfection.
In equilibrium, the agenda setter successfully proposes the policy she prefers
most from among the policies both pivotal legislators prefer to the status quo q. The
equilibrium thus depends on the location of the status quo, as can be seen in Figure
2. In interval I, all legislators prefer the agenda setters ideal over the status quo. As
a result the agenda setter successfully proposes her own ideal. In interval II, the left
pivotal legislator L no longer prefers the agenda setters ideal over the status quo.
So the agenda setter o¤ers as a proposal the policy  2R   q that makes legislator
L indi¤erent to the status quo. In interval III, the status quo prevails because the
three actors do not all want to move away from the status quo in the same direction.
In interval IV, they all prefer the agenda setters ideal over the status quo, so the
agenda setter successfully proposes her own ideal.
Assume next that the legislators appoint an oversight committee C. In partic-
ular, each legislator appoints one oversight committee member. Legislators L and
R appoint members CL and CR, respectively. The ideal policy result of oversight
committee members CL and CR are equal to dLR and dRR, respectively, with dL,
dR 2 R. Variables dL and dR measure how extreme the committee members are rela-
tive to the legislature. Figure 3 depicts a situation with extreme oversight committee
members and an extreme agenda setter.
The function of the oversight committee members is to advise the legislators on
whether to accept the proposal made by the agenda setter. Because there is perfect
information, however, they have no inuence on policy making if the legislators
cannot credibly commit to follow their advice.
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Figure 2: The equilibrium under perfect information without oversight.
Figure 3: An extreme agenda setter and extreme oversight committee members.
Assume that the legislators are able to credibly commit to follow the advice given
by their respective oversight committee members. What committee member should a
legislator appoint? Under perfect information, legislators know their position relative
to the status quo before they appoint their oversight committee members. For status
quos to the left of legislator L, and an agenda setter to the right of R, legislator L is
pivotal. However, as we can see in Figure 2, without being able to commit to vote
against proposals that make him indi¤erent to the status quo, legislator L stands
to gain little in the policy making process in interval II. By appointing an oversight
committee member CL who can act as a veto player and whose ideal result is at the
midpoint between the status quo and his own ideal result, dLR =
 R+q
2
, legislator L
can get the agenda setter to make a proposal much more protable for him. Indeed,
for all status quos to the left of legislator L, the legislator can obtain his ideal by
appointing such a veto player. For legislator R it is optimal to appoint an oversight
committee member as if he were pivotal, even though he is not.
Committing to follow the oversight committee members advice amounts to giving
him veto rights. This is equivalent to a scenario without oversight committee but
with a legislature that uses supermajority rule. Peress (2009) demonstrates that
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by adding supermajority requirements the median legislator can reduce the agenda-
setters powers and obtain policies that he prefers. In the following section we show
that in an asymmetric information model, legislators can obtain the same result
without giving oversight committee members veto rights or using a stricter majority
rule.
3 An asymmetric information model
In this section we introduce asymmetric information with regards to the consequences
of policy. The oversight committee members monitor the agenda setter and transmit
information about the consequences of policy to the legislators.
Actors have preferences over policy results rather than policies as such. The
result of policy p is represented by r(p) = p + !, where ! represents an external
shock that is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, !  U [0; 1]. Whereas all
players know the distribution of the shock, the actual realization of ! is knowledge
that can only be obtained by specializing.
We assume, following Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989), that the cost of spe-
cialization is su¢ ciently low for the agenda setter to specialize in equilibrium. We
further assume that the information obtained by specialization can be perfectly in-
ferred by monitoring. As such oversight committee members acquire perfect infor-
mation without engaging in costly research7. To ensure that the intervals identied
in the equilibria are within the unit interval we impose the following purely technical
restrictions: (1 + a)R < 1=4 and R < 1=8.
The sequence of events in the policy making process is as follows. In the rst
stage the agenda setter and the oversight committee members learn the value of
the external shock !. In the second stage the agenda setter drafts a proposal b.
Moreover, the oversight committee members CL and CR simultaneously send out
private signals sL and sR, respectively, to their respective legislators on the value of
the external shock !. These signals are continuous variables that can be interpreted
as the reported values of !. A signal is said to be consistent if the value of the shock,
as reported by the oversight committee member, matches with the value of the shock
that the agenda setters proposal suggests. In the nal stage legislators L and R vote
7In reality the oversight committee members may acquire only a fraction of the information the
agenda setting committee has. We assume, however, for simplicity, that both committees have the
same information.
8
on the proposal. The legislators do not observe the shock !, but they observe the
bill b and the signal of their oversight committee member, sL or sR. If both the
legislators accept the bill, the policy is adopted. Otherwise the status quo prevails.
During the policy making process the variables a, dL and dR are exogenous. The
equilibrium concept used is perfect Bayesian. The equilibrium characterizes agenda
setter As equilibrium proposal strategy b(!), oversight committee members CL
and CRs equilibrium signaling strategies sL(!) and s

R(!), the equilibrium beliefs
gL(b; sL) and g

R(b; sR) of the legislators, and the legislatorsvoting strategies v

L(b; sL)
and vR(b; sR). The equilibrium policy is policy p
(b; sL; sR; vL; vR).
Variable a is xed throughout the entire game. For simplicity we assume that the
agenda setter is to the right of the midpoint between the two legislators, that is, a > 0.
The analysis for an agenda setter to the left of the midpoint is analogous. Variables
dL and dR are chosen during the appointment process. A change in these values can
yield a di¤erent type of equilibria in the policy making process. However, certain
types of equilibria make more sense than others. We discuss the equilibrium for
dL 2 [ (2 + a); 1] and dR 2 [(2  a); 1]. This means that each oversight committee
member is to the opposite side of the legislator who appointed him, but not farther
away from that legislator than is the agenda setter. We do not discuss the equilibria
in the policy making process for other values of the variables dL and dR; that is, for
other locations of the oversight committee members, because it is easy to see that
the legislators would not appoint such oversight committee members in equilibrium.
First, a legislator would not appoint an oversight committee to the same side
of him as the agenda setter. He strictly prefers to appoint an oversight committee
member with the same preferences as himself. Suppose for instance that legislator
L chooses dL >  1 and that the oversight committee member CL is thus to the
legislators right. If the oversight committee member is to the agenda setters right,
the signal the oversight committee member sends is clearly less trustworthy than the
information the legislator derives from the proposal the agenda setter makes. If the
oversight committee member is located between the legislator and the agenda setter,
the legislator does not trust a signal by his committee member. Since committee
member CL is then closer to the agenda setter than is legislator L, he has an incentive
to send a positive signal too often. For those situations where the status quo result
is between the legislator and his committee member, CL may signal to accept a
proposal, while the legislator prefers the status quo. Furthermore, for those values of
the status quo result for which all players prefer a move to the right, the committee
member is willing to accept policy changes too far to the right from legislator Ls
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viewpoint. The legislator thus prefers to be perfectly informed by a committee
member with dL =  1 rather than by a committee member with dL >  1. The
analysis for dR and legislator R is similar.
Second, appointing an oversight committee member who is farther away from
him than is the agenda setter is not optimal for a legislator either. The signal the
legislator receives from the oversight committee member is then less trustworthy than
is the information he derives from the agenda setters proposal. Therefore he prefers
a committee member who is more to the right, and closer to himself. The formal
proof of this can be found in Appendix A.3.
The equilibria we discuss in the policy making process are extensions of Gilli-
gan and Krehbiels closed rule model for heterogeneous committees (1989). These
are better suited for our analysis than equilibria in other information models in the
literature. A rst set of such equilibria are those in which no information is trans-
mitted by the oversight committee members, and the agenda setter and legislators
ignore the oversight committee memberssignals. The legislators then rely on the
proposal b o¤ered by the agenda setter as the only source of information. This sit-
uation corresponds to Gilligan and Krehbiels closed rule model with a homogenous
committee (1987). They show that in such models, the agenda setter can make a
proposal that is certain to benet the legislators only if ! is very large or very small.
Moreover, for certain values of ! the agenda setter makes a proposal that is inferior
for both himself and the legislators, to signal that ! is indeed very low or very high.
This situation is clearly less benecial for all players than when there is additional
information from the oversight committee members. In the 1989 closed rule model,
on which our model is based, agenda setters are able to successfully propose a policy
for more values of !. Moreover, the agenda setter doesnt have to make an inferior
proposal to signal that ! is very low or very high, because the oversight committee
members provide additional information about ! that legislators can use.
A second set of alternative equilibria are presented by Krishna andMorgan (2001).
They propose an equilibrium in which a legislator chooses the status quo if the sig-
nal by the exogenous oversight committee, s, plus the agenda setters proposal, b,
does not equal the legislators ideal. In equilibrium the oversight committee mem-
ber truthfully reports the value of !, so that s = !, and the agenda setter makes
a proposal that results in the legislators ideal. Only if the oversight committee
member or the agenda setter do not prefer the legislators ideal over the status quo
result, a compromise proposal that deviates from the legislators ideal is made in
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that players direction to attract his support. In Krishna and Morgans model the
oversight committees location is exogenous.
In this paper we let legislators choose their oversight committee member. In Kr-
ishna and Morgans equilibria, the legislator prefers oversight committee members
closer to his ideal, because he wants to avoid situations where a compromise pro-
posal is made. The incentive to appoint oversight committee members closer to the
legislator leads to the situation in which the legislator appoints an oversight commit-
tee member with the same preferences as himself. As a consequence the legislator
is perfectly informed by the oversight committee member about the consequences
of policy. However, when there is perfect information, the legislator can no longer
credibly commit to refuse proposals that are di¤erent from his ideal. If the legisla-
tor prefers a proposal over the status quo, he accepts it. The agenda setter knows
this and therefore proposes her own ideal policy. So, while equilibria as in Krishna
and Morgan (2001) are more e¢ cient in transmitting information, the Gilligan and
Krehbiel (1989) equilibria are better suited for the study of endogenous oversight
committees.
3.1 Policy making with an extreme agenda setter
The equilibrium for an agenda setter to the right is characterized in Proposition 1.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 The agenda setter obtains her ideal policy result, if both oversight
committee members prefer it to the status quo result. By contrast, the status quo
result prevails, if the agenda setter and at least one of the oversight committee mem-
bers want to move in opposite directions away from the status quo result. Otherwise
the policy that makes the oversight committee member furthest away from the agenda
setter indi¤erent to the status quo is adopted. In particular, an equilibrium with
an informed agenda setter and two informed oversight committee members, and a
legislative body that uses supermajority rule consists of the following strategies and
beliefs:
The equilibrium proposal strategy:
b(!) =
8<:
aR  ! if !   q + aR or !  (2dL   a)R  q
2(dLR  !)  q if (2dL   a)R  q < !  dLR  q
b 2 [aR  1; aR; ] otherwise
The equilibrium signalling strategies:
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sL(!) =
8<:
! if !   q + aR or !  (2dL   a)R  q
! if (2dL   a)R  q < !  dLR  q
s2L 2 [0; 1] otherwise
sR(!) =
8<:
! if !   q + aR or !  (2dR   a)R  q
! if (2dR   a)R  q < !  dRR  q
sR 2 [0; 1] otherwise
The equilibrium beliefs:
gL(b; sL) =
8>>>><>>>>:
aR  b if b  q or b   2(dL   a)R+ q
and sL = aR  b
 [q + b]=2  dLR ifb 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q)
ands2L =
 (b+q)
2 + dLR
! 2 [dLR  q; aR  q] otherwise
gR(b; sR) =
8>>>><>>>>:
aR  b if b  q or b   2(dL   a)R+ q
and sR = aR  b
 [q + b]=2  dRR if b 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q)
and sR =
 (b+q)
2 + dLR
! 2 [dRR  q; aR  q] otherwise
The equilibrium voting strategies:
vL(b; sL) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if b  q or b   2(dL   a)R+ q
and sL = aR  b
1 if b 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q)
and sL =
 (b+q)
2 + dLR
0 otherwise
vR(b; sR) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if b  q or b   2(dL   a)R+ q
and sR = aR  b
1 if b 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q)
and sR =
 (b+q)
2 + dLR
0 otherwise
And the equilibrium policy is:
p(b; sL; sR; vL; vR) =
8><>:
b if b  q or b   2(dL   a)R+ q and sL =  (b+q)2 + dLR
b if b 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q) and sL =  (b+q)2 + dLR
q otherwise
The solid line in Figure 4 displays an example of the equilibrium with an extreme
agenda setter and an oversight committee member CL who is equidistant from the
legislator as is the agenda setter, that is dL =  a.8 On the horizontal axis the policy
8The choice of legislator LRs oversight committee member does not have an impact the equi-
librium for all possible dR 2 (2  a; 1).
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result of the status quo, q + !, is displayed. On the vertical axis the equilibrium
policy result can be found.
Figure 4: The equilibrium policy result with an extreme agenda setter.
For very small and very large values of ! (in intervals I and IV respectively)
the agenda setter is able to obtain her ideal policy result aR. More specically,
the agenda setter successfully proposes aR   ! as policy when !   q + aR and
when !  (2dL   a)R   q. In those situations the oversight committee member
prefers the agenda setters ideal policy result to the status quo result. The oversight
committee members then truthfully report the correct value of ! to their legislators.
The legislators know that the proposal is better for them than is the status quo and
vote in favor of the proposal. In interval II, where (2dL   a)R   q < !  dLR   q,
the agenda setter cannot attract the support of both oversight committee members
by proposing her ideal policy, because oversight committee member CL prefers the
result of the status quo. Therefore she seeks the support of this oversight committee
member by proposing the policy that makes the oversight committee member CL
indi¤erent to the result of the status quo. Again, both oversight committee members
then report the correct value of ! to their legislators; and these legislators vote in
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favor of the proposal. For all other values of !, in interval III, oversight committee
member CL is not willing to give a consistent signal because he prefers a move to the
left, whereas the agenda setter desires a move to the right. The agenda setter then
is unable to signal to the left legislator whether the proposal is benecial for him. In
the absence of any further information, the left legislator prefers the status quo over
any proposal that the agenda setter can make. As a result the status quo prevails in
interval III.
The broken line in Figure 4 also illustrates the equilibrium policy for a somewhat
more extreme (d0L <  a) oversight committee member for the left legislator. There
are two important consequences of the left legislators appointment of a more ex-
treme oversight committee member. First, the agenda setter is able to achieve her
ideal policy result for fewer status quos. In the Figure we can see this by noting that
interval I is smaller under d00L <  a than under dL =  a. This is due to the fact that
in equilibrium the agenda setter needs to seek the support of the more extreme over-
sight committee member. She does this by o¤ering the oversight committee member
CL a policy that is su¢ ciently to the left so that he will send out a consistent signal
!. This induces legislator L to accept the proposal.
Second, there is less information transmission by the left legislators oversight
committee member. He will refuse to send out a consistent signal for proposals that
are actually benecial for the legislator and this e¤ect is more pronounced than with
a more moderate oversight committee. We can see this in the Figure by noting that
interval III is larger for d0L <  a than it is for dL =  a:
3.2 Policy making with a moderate agenda setter
We now consider an agenda setter who is located between the two legislators (a 2
[ 1; 1]). For simplicity we continue to assume that the agenda setter is to the right
of the midpoint between the two legislators. The analysis for an agenda setter to the
left of the midpoint is analogous.
The equilibrium for a moderate agenda setter is similar to the equilibrium with an
extreme agenda setter and is characterized in Appendix A.2. Figure 5 illustrates the
equilibrium with a moderate agenda setter and with two types of oversight committee
members CL and CR.
Let us rst discuss the equilibrium by focusing on the solid line. This line repre-
sents the equilibrium with oversight committee members that are equally far away
from their legislators than is the agenda setter (dL =  (2+a) and dR = (2 a)). For
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Figure 5: The equilibrium policy result with a moderate agenda setter.
very small and very large values of ! (in intervals I and V respectively) the agenda
setter is able to obtain her ideal policy result aR; because the oversight committee
members prefer it to the status quo result. For values of !  (2dL   a)R   q and
!  (2dR a)R q the agenda setters ideal policy result is attractive enough for the
oversight committee members to report the correct value of ! to their legislator L.
The legislators then know that the proposal is better for them than is the status quo
and vote in favor of it. In interval II, where (2dL a)R q < !  dLR q, the agenda
setter cannot attract the support of oversight committee CL by proposing her ideal
policy, because oversight committee member CL prefers the result of the status quo.
Therefore she seeks the support of this oversight committee member by proposing
the policy that makes the oversight committee member CL indi¤erent to the result of
the status quo. Both oversight committee members then send a consistent signal and
the legislators approve the proposal. In interval III the status quo prevails. Either
oversight committee member CL or oversight committee member CR is not willing
to give a consistent signal because he prefers a move in one direction of the status
quo, whereas the agenda setter desires a move to the other side. The agenda setter
is unable to signal to both legislators that the proposal is benecial for them. At
least one of the legislators prefers the status quo over any proposal that the agenda
setter can make and votes against. As a result the status quo prevails. Finally, in
interval IV, when dRR  q < !  (2dR a)R  q, the agenda setter is able to attract
the support of oversight committee member CR by proposing the policy that makes
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him indi¤erent to the status quo. Both oversight committee members then send a
consistent signal, the legislators vote in favor of the proposal, and the proposal is
adopted.
The broken line in Figure 5 represents what happens if the oversight committee
members have the same preferences as their respective legislators, so dL =  1 and
dR = 1. The Figure illustrates that as the legislators appoint more extreme oversight
committee members, the equilibrium policy becomes more extreme as well.
Variables dL and dR inuence di¤erent segments of the equilibrium policy re-
sult. The arrow towards the lower left corner shows how legislator Ls choice of
dL inuences the equilibrium policy result, whereas the arrow towards the upper
right corner shows legislator Rs inuence by choosing dR. In other words, the left
legislator can inuence the equilibrium policy results for small values of the status
quo result, whereas the right legislator can inuence the equilibrium policy result for
larger status quos. So if legislator L appoints an extreme oversight committee mem-
ber CL with dL =  (2 + a) and legislator R appoints oversight committee member
CR with the same preferences as himself, with dR = 1, the equilibrium policy result
is indicated by the solid line in intervals II and in interval III up to q + ! = R, and
by the broken line in the remainder of interval III.
In the next section we discuss the optimal oversight committee member choices
for the legislators.
4 The oversight committee appointment
In this section we show that it is optimal for the legislators to appoint commit-
tee members with preferences di¤erent from their own. Their distributional gains
are then larger than the informational cost of appointing such oversight committee
members. Contrary to what one might expect, legislators prefer not to have per-
fect information with regards to the consequences of policy, but to let a strategic
committee member transmit this information to them.
In our model each legislator chooses his own oversight committee member, and
this members signal is only visible to the legislator who appointed him. An oversight
committee members signal thus does not have any impact on the other legislator.
Therefore, the legislators appoint the same oversight committee members as they
would if they were the only legislator in the policy making process.
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Let dL denote legislator Ls optimal choice and let d

R denote legislatorRs optimal
choice. Proposition 2 characterizes these optimal choices. The proofs can be found
in Appendix A.4.
Proposition 2 Legislators L and R choose oversight committee members CL and
CR who are equally far away from them as is the agenda setter, but in the other
direction. If the agenda setter is to a legislators right, that legislator thus appoints
an oversight committee member to his left. The optimal level of extremeness for
legislator L is dL =  (2 + a) and the optimal level for legislator R is dR = 2  a.
First we illustrate that it is indeed worthwhile for legislator L to source out
monitoring to an oversight committee member who is farther away from the agenda
setter.9 The solid line in Figure 6 shows how far the equilibrium policy result is
from legislator Ls ideal policy as a function of the location of the status quo result,
if legislator L appoints an oversight committee member with dL =  (2 + a). The
horizontal axis displays the status quo result q + !. The vertical axis measures the
distance between the result of the equilibrium policy p(b; sL; sR; vL; vR) and the
legislators ideal, jr(p(b; sL; sR; vL; vR))  Lj. Legislator L prefers values close to
0 on the vertical axis over larger values because it indicates that the result of the
equilibrium policy is closer to his ideal. The discrepancy between what he wants and
what he gets is then smaller.
Figure 6: The gains to legislator L from outsourcing monitoring to an ideal oversight
committee member with dL =  (2 + a).
For two values of the status quo result does the legislator obtain his ideal policy
result: when the status quo result is equal to (2dL+1)R; and when it is equal to  R.
9By sourcing out monitoring, we refer to the legislatorsincentives not to know the consequences
of policies and appoint a committee member with di¤erent prefences.
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That is, legislator L obtains his ideal policy result, when the status quo result is equal
to his ideal and when the status quo result makes committee member CL indi¤erent
to legislator Ls ideal policy result. In intervals I and IV the agenda setter gets her
ideal policy result, and the distance between legislator L s ideal policy result and the
equilibrium policy result is then (1 + a)R. In interval II the agenda setter attracts
the support of oversight committee member CL by proposing the policy that makes
him indi¤erent to the status quo result. At the left end of the interval this is the
agenda setters ideal policy. As the external shock becomes larger, the agenda setter
proposes a policy more to the left. At rst this brings the equilibrium policy result
closer to legislator L; but then it moves policy farther away again. At the right end
of the interval the agenda setter proposes the status quo result. In interval III the
status quo result prevails. Again, the distance to legislator Ls ideal policy result
decreases at the left end of the interval, but then increases again.
The dotted line in Figure 6 shows the equilibrium policy for an oversight commit-
tee member CL with the same ideal policy result as legislator L (dL = 1). Legislator
L then has perfect information due to noiseless information transmission. The equi-
librium policy is similar to the equilibrium policy when dL =  (2 + a), except in
interval II. The agenda setter only proposes a compromise when the left legislator
prefers the status quo result over the ideal policy result of the agenda setter. The
agenda setter knows that this is not the case and thus successfully proposes her own
ideal policy result in interval II. So, in interval II the legislator prefers to source
out the monitoring to an oversight committee member to his left, rather than have
perfect information.
Thus, legislator L benets from not knowing the consequences of a policy perfectly
well and appointing an oversight committee member who strategically transmits in-
formation back to him. The distance between the two lines illustrates the extent of
the benets of outsourcing to an oversight committee member with dL =  (2 + a):
The benets are strictly positive only in interval II illustrated by the shaded area. If
the legislator knows the value of ! perfectly well (either by acquiring perfect infor-
mation himself or by having an oversight committee with the same ideal policy), he
cannot make a credible commitment to reject marginally improving o¤ers since they
provide at least the same utility as the status quo. When the oversight committee is
more extreme, the agenda setter makes a proposal that is marginally attractive to the
oversight committees - inducing the oversight committee to send a consistent signal.
This proposal is much more attractive for the legislator than a proposal that makes
him indi¤erent to the status quo. So by delegating the monitoring to an oversight
committee member, the legislator gets a policy result closer to his ideal policy result.
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We now show that it is optimal for legislator L to appoint a committee member
as extreme as dL =  (2+a). This is illustrated in Figure 7. The solid line shows the
equilibrium policy result for an intermediate dL 2 ( (2+a); 1). Appointing a more
moderate oversight committee member results in smaller gains from outsourcing than
does appointing a more extreme committee member. The upper right part of the
grey triangle is chipped o¤ when dL >  (2 + a). The agenda setter successfully
proposes her ideal policy for a wider range of status quos. Interval I is larger and
interval II is smaller than they are in Figure 6. Nonetheless, it is clear from this
Figure that any d 2 ( 2 a; 1] creates a credible commitment not to accept certain
proposals. The benets to legislator L are smaller than in the dL =  (2 + a) case,
but outsourcing to a somewhat extreme oversight committee is clearly also benecial
for him compared to having perfect information.
Figure 7: The gains to legislator L from outsourcing the monitoring to an oversight com-
mittee with dL 2 ( 2  a; 1).
Our ndings extend the results of Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989). They found that
if there is a cost to the agenda setter when she specializes, a closed rule procedure
can be more benecial than an open rule since it provides incentives for the agenda
setter to specialize. Specialization reduces the variance for all players thus leading
to a higher utility for all. Yet, the cost of specialization born by the agenda setter
may outweigh the benet from the reduction in variance. As a result, under the open
rule the agenda setter may not want to specialize. The closed rule gives the agenda
setter a distributional benet on top of the variance reduction. The legislator may
still benet as a result of the variance reduction, in spite of the distributional loss to
the agenda setter.
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Our results contribute to this literature by showing that there is a middle ground
between the two extremes of employing an open rule and obtaining no benets from
variance reduction, and a closed rule but incurring a distributional loss. By appoint-
ing a strategic oversight committee, the legislators can get a policy closer to their
own ideal results in a closed rule procedure, while still leaving enough incentives
to specialize for the agenda setter. This enables the legislators to skim the surplus
created by the specialization rather than having the agenda setter capture almost all
the distributional benets.
If the cost of specialization for the agenda setter is high, the legislators may
not want to appoint oversight committee members as extreme as dL =  (2 + a).
The legislators can look for the most e¢ cient incentives to specialize: if the cost
is really low, they use an open procedure. If the cost of specialization is above a
certain threshold, they use a closed rule procedure in combination with extreme
oversight committee members. As the cost increases further, the optimal locations
of the oversight committee members are closer to the agenda setter.
We conclude that legislators have incentives to appoint oversight committee mem-
bers who are biased away from the agenda setter, that is they have preferences dif-
ferent from their legislators in the opposite direction than is the agenda setter. What
matters for the agenda setter is that she obtains the approval of legislator L, because
legislator L is farthest away from the agenda setter and his approval is thus more
di¢ cult to obtain. Legislator R approves all proposals that legislator L approves.
For this reason, the agenda setters optimal proposal strategy is the same as if the
left legislator is the only legislator.
A somewhat more complicated scenario occurs when the agenda setter is moder-
ate, with a 2 [ 1; 1]. The left legislator is pivotal for moves to the right. He is unsure
whether a policy change in that direction is benecial for him. Indeed, proposals that
move policy to the right could be too extreme for him. For policy changes to the left
he has no uncertainty regarding the proposals merit: if the agenda setter prefers a
policy to the left of the status quo, the legislator prefers the agenda setters ideal to
the status quo result. The right legislator faces a similar situation for policy changes
to the left direction.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we develop a model that evaluates the strategic considerations involved
in the legislatures appointment of an oversight committee as an instrument to mon-
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itor an agenda setter. This situation is representative of EU external trade policy.
In the EU the Council appoints a TPC to monitor the agenda setting Commission.
We present a game-theoretical model with asymmetric information. In it, over-
sight committee members are appointed, whose function is to provide legislators with
information regarding the consequences of policy. Our ndings are that legislators
have powerful incentives to appoint oversight committee members that have di¤erent
preferences from their own. The oversight committee member that is appointed by a
legislator is biased to the same extent as the agenda setters preferences di¤er from
the legislators, but in the opposite direction.
In equilibrium we nd that legislators only accept proposals that their respective
oversight committee member prefers over the status quo. Therefore, the agenda
setter wants to attract the support of the oversight committee members. When the
committee members have diverging preferences, the proposal the agenda setter makes
is only marginally improving over the status quo for the pivotal oversight committee
member, but is much more benecial from the viewpoint of the pivotal legislator.
In the EU the member states benet from having a TPC. Not only is reduced
uncertainty benecial for all members, it also ensures that more policies benecial
to a supermajority of members are accepted. Moreover, having a biased oversight
committee member ensures that the proposals are not pulled too far away from what
a legislator wants.
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A Appendix
The Appendix consists out of the proof for the extreme left and right agenda setter, the
optimal level of dL and the reason behind dL   (2 + a).
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We divide our analysis of the equilibrium in several sections.
1. We start to look at the equilibrium where A is able to propose its ideal location.
(a) The rst place where it can do so, is if b < q. If A makes such a proposal, it
must mean that q + ! > aR. In that situation, all interest are aligned and all
players should prefer the ideal point of A, which corresponds to b = aR !, so
that the result of this proposal is the ideal location of A. Since also CL and CR
benets from this proposal, they send out the true signal signal s = ! = aR b.
Observing b < q and sL = aR  b and sR = aR  b, the legislators accept b.
(b) There is also another way A could get its ideal location. CL is the most remote
player whose support the agenda setter needs to attract. Therefore, if a proposal
is in the acceptance set of CL, it is benecial for all players. This is possible as
long as CL accepts this b over the status quo
jq + !; dLRj > jaR; dLRj
dLR  q   ! > aR  dLR
! < (2dL   a)R  q
So if ! < (2dL   a)R  q, CL is happy with b = aR  ! and gives a true signal
sL = ! = aR  b. Also CR prefers this proposal over the status quo, so he also
sends out sR = aR  b Since b = aR  !, it is so that ! = aR  b, such that if
the legislators observe
aR  b < (2dL   a)R  q
b >  2(dL   a)R+ q
and the described signal, they will accept the proposal.
2. For an ! just larger than (2dL   a)R  q, all players accept CL accept the proposal.
To attract the support of CL, the agenda setter makes a proposal CL is indi¤erent
over with respect to the status quo. This is only possible when q + ! < dLR and
results in the following proposal
dLR+ jq + !; dLRj = b+ !
2(dLR  !)  q = b
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This will be the proposal as long as CL can accept it, so as long as q + ! < dLR,
and until b + ! = aR, which happens when ! = (2dL   a)R   q. Again, CL and
CR are satised and they give a true signal. This is also a good thing for the
legislators, so when they observe a proposal that corresponds with this situation,
b 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q) and sL =  (b+q)2   dLR, or sR =  (b+q)2   dLR, they accept
the proposal.
3. The only thing left to discuss is what happens for ! 2 (dLR   q; aR   q). In this
segment, there is no signal given by CL, so legislator L knows that ! must fall in
this interval. There is still room for proposals as long as q + ! <  R, as then all
player - besides CL of course - will want a move to the right. However, since setting
a proposal b gives also information on the value of !, A could potentially set a large
b to signal a low ! and to fool the legislature. Fooling happens only if A has an
incentive to fool: as long as it could not set its ideal point if L knew the true value
of !
q + ! >  R  jaR; Rj
q + ! >  R(2 + a)
! >  (2 + a)R  q
So if ! >  (2 + a)R   q, the agenda setter has an incentive to fool. It is now easy to
see that for all remaining ! 2 (dLR  q; aR  q), A has an incentive to fool the legislature
if dL   (2 + a), since then the legislature knows that - in absence of a consistent signal
- ! >  (2 + a)R  q. As such, it is clear to see that L prefers to choose the status quo in
the remaining cases, based on the prior.
A.2 Equilibrium with moderate agenda setter
The equilibrium for a moderate agenda setter and its proof is characterized below.
Proposition 3 The agenda setter obtains her ideal policy result, if both oversight commit-
tee members prefer it to the status quo result. By contrast, the status quo prevails, if the
agenda setter and at least one oversight committee member want to move in opposite direc-
tions away from the status quo. Otherwise the policy that makes the oversight committee
member that is pivotal in the direction of the policy change indi¤erent to the status quo is
adopted. In particular, an equilibrium with an informed agenda setter and two informed
oversight committee members, and a legislature that uses supermajority rule consists of the
following strategies and beliefs:
The equilibrium proposal strategy:
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b(!) =
8>><>>:
aR  ! if !  (2dR   a)R  q or !  (2dL   a)R  q
2(dLR  !)  q if (2dL   a)R  q < !  dLR  q
2(dRR  !)  q if dRR  q < !  (2dR   a)R  q
b 2 [aR  1; aR] otherwise
The equilibrium signalling strategies:
sL(!) =
8>><>>:
! if !  (2dL   a)R  q
! if (2dL   a)R  q < !  dLR  q
! if !  aR  q
sL 2 [0; 1] otherwise
sR(!) =
8>><>>:
! if !  (2dR   a)R  q
! if dRR  q  ! < (2dR   a)R  q
! if !  aR  q
sR 2 [0; 1] otherwise
The equilibrium beliefs:
gL(b; sL) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
aR  b if b   2(dL   a)R+ q
and sL = aR  b
aR  b if b   2(dR   a)R+ q
and sL = aR  b
 [q + b]=2  dLR if b 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q)
and sL =
 (b+q)
2 + dLR
 [q + b]=2  dRR if b 2 ( 2(dR   a)R+ q; q)
and sL =
 (b+q)
2 + dRR
! 2 [dLR  q; aR  q] otherwise
gR(b; sR) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
aR  b if b   2(dL   a)R+ q
and sR = aR  b
aR  b if b   2(dR   a)R+ q
and sR = aR  b
 [q + b]=2  dLR if b 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q)
and sR =
 (b+q)
2 + dLR
 [q + b]=2  dRR if b 2 ( 2(dR   a)R+ q; q)
and sR =
 (b+q)
2 + dRR
! 2 [dRR  q; aR  q] otherwise
The equilibrium voting strategies:
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vL(b; s) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1 if b   2(dL   a)R+ q
and sL = aR  b
1 if b   2(dR   a)R+ q
and sL = aR  b
1 if b 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q)
and sL =
 (b+q)
2 + dLR
1 if b 2 ( 2(dR   a)R+ q; q)
and sL =
 (b+q)
2 + dRR
0 otherwise
vR(b; s) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1 if b   2(dL   a)R+ q
and sR = aR  b
1 if b   2(dR   a)R+ q
and sR = aR  b
1 if b 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q)
and sR =
 (b+q)
2 + dLR
1 if b 2 ( 2(dR   a)R+ q; q)
and sR =
 (b+q)
2 + dRR
0 otherwise
And the equilibrium policy is:
p(b; sL; sR; vL; vR) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
b if b   2(dL   a)R+ q, and sL = sR = aR  b
b if b   2(dR   a)R+ q, and sL = sR = aR  b
b if b 2 (q; 2(dL   a)R+ q) and sL = sR =  (b+q)2 + dLR
b if b 2 ( 2(dR   a)R+ q; q) and sL = sR =  (b+q)2 + dRR
q otherwise
Proof. This is the proof of Proposition 3. We divide our analysis of the equilibrium in
several sections.
1. We start to look at the equilibrium where A is able to propose its ideal location. It
can do so when it is in the acceptance set of the two extreme oversight committee
members.
(a) The rst place where both oversight committee members accept it, if is the
status quo result is very far to the right of CR. Then all players prefer the
agenda setters ideal over the status quo result. This happens when
q + !  dRR+ jaR; dRRj
!  (2dR   a)R  q
So in that situation, b = aR   !. Since both CL and CR benet from this
proposal, they send out a true signal sL = sR = ! = aR   b. When the
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legislators observe
aR  b  (2dR   a)R  q
b   2(dR   a)R+ q
and a signal from their respective oversight committee member as described
above, they accept the proposal.
(b) The second place where both oversight committee members accept the agenda
setters ideal is if it is very far to the left of CL. Then all players prefer the
agenda setters ideal over the status quo result. This happens when
q + !  dLR  jaR; dLRj
!  (2dL   a)R  q
Since both CL and CR benet from this proposal, they send out a true signal
sL = sR = ! = aR  b. When the legislators observe
aR  b  (2dL   a)R  q
b   2(dL   a)R+ q
and a signal from their respective oversight committee member as described
above, they accept the proposal.
2. For an ! in the interval [(2dL   a)R   q; dLR   q], oversight committee member no
longer prefers the agenda setters ideal. However, the agenda setter can attract the
support of CL by making a proposal this oversight committee member is indi¤erent
over with respect to the status quo. This is only possible when q + !  dLR and
results in the following proposal
dLR+ jq + !; dLRj = b+ !
2(dLR  !)  q = b
This will be the proposal as long as CL can accept it, so as long as q+! < dLR, and
until b + ! = aR, which happens when ! = (2dL   a)R   q. Again, both oversight
committee members CL and CR prefer this proposal over the status quo and give a
true signal on !. So when the legislators observe a proposal that corresponds with
this situation, b 2 (q; 2(dL a)R+ q) and sL =  (b+q)2  dLR or sR =  (b+q)2  dLR
they will accept the proposal.
3. For an ! in the interval [dRR  q; (2dR   a)R  q], oversight committee member no
longer prefers the agenda setters ideal. However, the agenda setter can attract the
support of CR by making a proposal this oversight committee member is indi¤erent
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over with respect to the status quo. This is only possible when q + !  dRR and
results in the following proposal
dRR  jq + !; dRRj = b+ !
2(dRR  !)  q = b
This will be the proposal as long as CR can accept it, so as long as q+!  dLR, and
until b + ! = aR, which happens when ! = (2dR   a)R   q. Again, both oversight
committee members CL and CR prefer this proposal over the status quo and give a
true signal on !. So when the legislators observe a proposal that corresponds with
this situation, b 2 ( 2(dR a)R+q; q) and sR =  (b+q)2  dRR or sL =  (b+q)2  dRR
they will accept the proposal.
4. The only thing left to discuss is what happens for ! 2 (dLR   q; dRR   q). In this
segment, there is either no signal given by CL, or no signal by CR. Therefore there is
always one legislator that, in accordance to the previous proof, prefers the status quo
in absence of an informative signal by his oversight committee member. Therefore
the status quo prevails in those situations.
A.3 Proof of bounds on dL
Proof. First we discuss the lower bound on dL, then we discuss the upper bound.
1. We will discuss what happens in the models if dL <  (2 + a). In the hypothesized
equilibrium, most remains the same as in the previous case. So if the legislature
observes that the non-agenda setting committee gives an inconsistent !, it knows
that ! 2 ( (2+a)R; R). Yet it becomes possible to submit a non-fooling proposal,
for  dLR < q+! <  (2+ a)R. So rst we look at for which values of ! that A will
want to cheat. This is when the agenda setting committee would not be able to set
its ideal policy if L knew the value of !.
q + ! >  R  j R; aRj ) q + ! >  R  (aR+R)
, ! >  (2 + a)R  q
Therefore, as we have discussed before, if dL <  (2 + a), there exists a value of
! that has not yet been signaled by the oversight committee for which the agenda
setter doesnt need to cheat. So the next question is which proposals could only be
made if ! <  (2 + a)R  q. It is clear that this is when
jb+ !; aRj  jq + !; aRj ) b+ !   aR  aR  q   !
, b+ 2( (2 + a)R  q)  2aLR   q
, b  4(1 + a)R+ q
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However, these proposals constitute a credible commitment on behalf of the agenda
setter. It commits to a large proposal to signal that ! is low. But this signal is
expensive for both the agenda setter as the legislator, since both would prefer a
proposal more to the left. Therefore the left legislator L prefers to set dL =  (2+ a)
over any dL <  (2 + a): it leads to a proposal that is at maximum as far away from
the legislator as the the agenda setters ideal, whereas as non-fooling proposal would
always be at or beyond the agenda setters ideal.
2. We can prove that the upper bound on dL is  1 by showing that legislator L would
prefer dL =  1 over all dL >  1. There are four scenarios to discuss.
 q + !   (2 + a)R. This is when the status quo result is so far to the left that
L prefers the agenda setters ideal over the status quo result. In this situation
legislator L is indi¤erent between dL =  1 and dL >  1. In both cases the
agenda setter proposes her ideal and all players accept.
 q+! 2 ( (2+a)R; R). This is when the status quo is to legislator Ls left such
that he prefers the status quo over the agenda setters ideal. If dL =  1, the
legislator is perfectly informed and the agenda setter makes drafts a proposal
that makes the agenda setter indi¤erent over it and the status quo. If dL >  1,
the signal by the oversight committee member is uninformative. Believing the
signal of the oversight committee member CL cannot be part of an equilibrium
because then the agenda setter would make a proposal that makes committee
member CL indi¤erent over it and the status quo. If legislator L would then be
better o¤ to vote against it and not to follow the oversight committee members
advice. So the legislator strictly prefers to have dL =  1 over dL >  1.
 q + ! 2 ( R; dLR). The legislator wants to move in a di¤erent direction away
from the status quo than do his oversight committee member and the agenda
setter. Therefore he cannot trust the signal of a committee member with dL >
 1. Therefore he strictly prefers to have dL =  1 over dL >  1.
 q + !  dLR. In this scenario the signal of the oversight committee member
with dL >  1 could be trusted. However, a signal from an oversight committee
member with dL =  1 would be equally trustworthy. Therefore the legislator
is indi¤erent between dL =  1 and dL >  1.
Analysis over the entire range of q+! shows that indeed legislator L strictly prefers
dL =  1 over dL >  1.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We discuss what happens if there is an extreme right agenda setting committee.
To calculate the optimal position of CL from Ls viewpoint, we rst look at his expected
utility in terms of dL:
EUL =
Z (2dL a)R q
0
 ((1 + a)R)2f(!)d!
+
Z dLR q
(2dL a)R q
 (2dLR  q   ! +R)2f(!)d!
+
Z  q+aR
dLR q
 (q + ! +R)2f(!)d!
+
Z 1
 q+aR
 ((1 + a)R)2f(!)d!
After taking the rst derivative and solving for dL, we nd that the utility maximizing
dL for L is d

L =  (2 + a). However, the location of the oversight committee member CR
has no inuence on the expected utility. Therefore, every location of dR 2 [1; 2   a] is
supported as an equilibrium. We now discuss what happens if there is a moderate agenda
setting committee. To calculate the optimal position of CL from Ls viewpoint, we rst
look at his expected utility in terms of dL:
EUL =
Z (2dL a)R q
0
 (aR+R)2f(!)d!
+
Z dLR q
(2dL a)R q
 (2dLR  !   q +R)2f(!)d!
+
Z dRR q
dLR q
 (R+ q + !)2f(!)d!
+
Z (2dR a)R q
dRR q
 (2dRR  q   ! +R)2f(!)d!
+
Z 1
(2dR a)R q
 (aR+R)2f(!)d!
Next we look for the value of dL that maximizes this expression. After taking the rst
derivative and solving for dL, we nd that the utility maximizing dL for L equals d

L =
 (2+a). To nd the optimal dR from the viewpoint of legislator R, we look at his expected
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utility function in terms of dR:
EUR =
Z (2dL a)R q
0
 ( aR+R)2f(!)d!
+
Z dLR q
(2dL a)R q
 ( 2dLR+ ! + q +R)2f(!)d!
+
Z dRR q
dLR q
 (R  q   !)2f(!)d!
+
Z (2dR a)R q
dRR q
 ( 2dRR+ q + ! +R)2f(!)d!
+
Z 1
(2dR a)R q
 ( aR+R)2f(!)d!
Next we look for the value of dR that maximizes this expression. After taking the rst
derivative and solving for dR, we nd that the utility maximizing dR for R equals d

R = 2 a.
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